Overview on Anthony Giddens

"The Consequences of Modernity" and "The Constitution of Society"

Pure Relationships

Giddens starts his institution as analysis of modernity by simplifying the modernity as it refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence. This definition consequences the modernity to associate with a time period and with an initial geographical location. The need for a transition which would take us beyond modernity itself is concrete, the need comes from the definition of the modernity. He refers positively to the emergence of new type of system - information society or the consumer society. But he states that the preceding state of affairs is drawing to a close that what he calls post-modernity, post modernism, post-capitalism.

The development of modern social institutions and their worldwide spread have created vastly greater opportunities for human beings to enjoy a secure and rewarding existence than any type of pre-modern system. So unlike the pre-modern systems, modernity defines the security and danger, trust and risk in a position that has a somber side. He quotes Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber ideas about the troubled area in this system. Marx saw class struggle as the source of fundamental schism in the capitalistic order, but at the same time envisaged the emergence of a more humare social system. On the other hand, Durkheim stated that further expansion of individualism would establish a harmonious and fulfilling social life, integrated through a combination of the division of labor and moral individualism. Max Weber is the one has the most pessimistic thoughts about the modernity. He sees the modern world as a paradoxical one in which material progress was obtained only at the cost of an expansion of bureaucracy that cruhed individual creativity and autonomy.

As he points out the association of modernity with a time period, he argues the time and space relation more in the modern society. "When" is almost universally either with "where" or identified by regular natural occurrences in the pre-modern world. Time was still connected with the space (and place) until the uniformity of time measurement of time.

He states that the coordination across time is the basis of the control of space in terms of "emptying of space" and "emptying of time". Empty space is the separation of space from place. Place is conceptualized as means of the idea of locale, which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically. Space and place largely coincide in pre-modern societies. In condition of modernity, place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric, locales is
not simply that which is present on the screen; this structures the visible form of
the locale concealing the distanced relations. Empty space is not bound up
with the emergence of uniform modes of measurement. The severing of the time
from the space provides a basis of their recombination in relation to social activity
which can be understood as time-space ordering. So, why is the separation of
time and space- emptying of space and emptying of time - so curial to the
extreme dynamism of modernity? He gives the answer in three steps. He says
that the separation of time and space and their formation into standardized,
"empty" dimensions cut through the connections between social activity and its
embedding in the particularities of context of space. This can be related to his
eyearly definition of the coordination across time and space which the scope of
time-space distanciation mostly depend upon. This may also lead quitting the
restraints of local habits and practices which may cause possible changes on this
phenomenon.

He states his second answer to the question as the separation provides the
gearing mechanisms for that distinctive feature of modern social life - the
rationalized organization. Modern organizations, as he defines, are able to
connect the local and the global in ways, which is a constitution of modernity,
doing routinely affect the lives of many people. In the last step, he defines history,
as the systematic oppression of the past to help shape the future. The
development of modern institutions gave it a fundamentally new impetus, which
may have an affect on the unitary past.

Time and space are recombined to form a genuinely world-historical framework
of action and experience.

"Trust; confidence in or reliance on so quality or attribute of a person or thing, or
the truth of a statement,"

Oxford Dictionary

Trust operates in environments of risk, in which varying of levels of security -
against danger - that can be archived. He argues how trust, risk, security and
danger articulate in conditions of modernity. He quotes Luhmann's definition of
trust as it should be understood specifically in relation to risk, a term which only
comes into being in the modern period. Understanding that unanticipated results
may be a consequences of our own activities or decisions, rather than expressing
hidden meanings of nature or in effable intentions of deity. He compares the two
terms - confidence and trust - in the modern society knowledge. Trust and
confidence both refer to expectations which can be frustrated or cast down.
Confidence refers to a more or less taken-forgranted attitude that familiar things
will remain stable - "You are confident that your expectations will not be
disappointed".
The distinction between trust and confidence depends upon whether the possibility of frustration is influenced by one's own previous behavior and hence upon a correlate discrimination between risk and danger. Because the notion of risk is relatively recent in origin. He states that the possibility of separation risk and danger must derive from social characteristic of modernity.

He conceptualizes trust as a series of ten points which we can find relations with the Can-go idea.

___ He relates trust to absence in time and in space. There would be no need to trust anyone whose activities were continually visible and whose thought processes were transparent, or to trust any system whose workings were wholly known and understood. Can-go idea is based on the network of trust between the people. However they implement their own network, it expands through many circles and the whole network takes place under the name of Can-go. To keep the trust real and continually, Can-go itself should be transparent even it exists now as an idea. This is extremely the main reason why we do not suggest a centralized service system, instead we want to maintain a network of continues intersection between people.

___ He states that the trust is basically bound up, not with risk, but with contingency.

___ Trust is precisely the link between faith and confidence and it is this which distinguishes it from "weak inductive knowledge".

___ Trust in persons is always to some degree relevant to faith in systems, but concerns their proper working rather than their operation as such. You may trust someone to share the ride, but you may not trust him/her to barrow some money. Trust is also degree relevant between the social interaction of people.

___ Trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles.

___ In conditions of modernity, trust exists in the contexts of the general awareness that human activity is socially created, and in the context of the vastly increased transformative scope of human action which is brought about by the dynamic character of modern social institutions.

___ What risk presumes is precisely danger- not necessarily awareness of danger. Danger and risk are closely related, but are not the same. A person who risks something courts danger. In this case we can say that the danger is a threat to desired outcomes.

___ Risk and trust intertwine, trust normally serving to reduce or minimize the dangers to which particular types of activity are subject. "Acceptable risk" - the
minimizing the danger - varies in different context, but is usually control in sustaining trust.

__In this case he states the "environments of risk" which we can say that risk is not just a matter of individual action. For instance, potentially everyone on the face of the world, as in the case of the risk of ecological disaster. Security is a situation in which a specific set of dangers is minimized. The experience of security rests upon a balance of trust and acceptable risk. This may be up to including global security or to individuals.

__He strongly argues that the mistrust is not simply what constitutes the opposite of trust.

Sustaining of trust connects with globalized social relations. He states a discussion in the familiar sociological observation that in modern social life many people, much of the time, interact with others who are strangers to them. But the meaning of the term "stranger" changes with the modernity. He points out that in pre-modern cultures, where the local community always remains the basis of wider social organization, the "stranger" refers to a "whole person" - someone who comes from the outside and who is potentially suspect. In modern society, by contrast, he argues that we do not characteristically interact with strangers as "whole people" in the same way as it was in the pre-modern cultures. Particularly in many urban settings, we interact more or less continuously with others whom we either do not know well or have never met before, but as he says this interaction takes the form of relatively fleeting contacts. Tact and ritual of politeness are mutual protective devices, which strangers or acquaintances knowingly use. Civil inattention is states as the strangers in circumstances of modernity. Encounters with strangers or acquaintances - people whom an individual has met before, but does not know well - balance trust, tact, and power. This is exactly what we accept in the concrete Can-go network. Everybody in this network will keep his/her responsibility as being "stranger" in the modern world. This can establish trustworthiness in the network of trust.

Trustworthiness is also established between individuals who are well known to one another and who, on the basis of long-term acquaintances, have substantiated the credentials.

He continues his argument on the nature of modern institutions that is deeply bound up with the mechanisms of trust in abstract systems, especially trust in expert systems. In his argument he says that the future is always open in condition of modernity, but more in terms of the reflexivity of knowledge in relation to which social practices are organized. Modernity has future-oriented character which is largely structured by trust vested abstract systems - it is filtered by the trustworthiness of established expertise. According to his statement we can say that there will be a more need to the trust based systems as a consequences of modernity. In the modern society trust mechanisms do not
relate only to the connections between lay persons and experts; they are also bound up with the activities of those who are "within" abstract systems. He represents the trust relations as the basic to the extended time-space distanciation associated with modernity.

As he before conceptualized the trust in ten series of terms, he extends the meaning of mistrust more. He questions the opposite of trust. There are circumstances where the absence of trust could be characterized as mistrust, but he finds "mistrust" as too weak a term to express the antithesis of trust. Mistrust applies when we are speaking of the relation of an agent to a specific systems, individual or type of individual. It means being sceptical about - having an actively negative attitude toward, the claims to expertise that system incorporates. He conceptualise the antithesis of trust as thus a state of mind which could best be sunned up as existential angst or dread.

As a conclusion to an overview on Anthony Giddens' words in "The Consequences of Modernity" and "The Constitution of Society" we can state that modernity is inherently future-oriented. This dynamic nature of modernity leads us to move into a period of "high modernity" instead of "post-modernity". Ofcourse the "high modernity", as a consequences of modernity, is more radicalized and globlized than before. Trust based systems has already their presence in this high modernity. These trust platforms can be also guidelines to potential future transformations which needs a social movements' activities and powers.

Trust platforms need more "pure relationships" whether between individuals or between individuals and organizations, but these pure relationships, like many other aspects of high modernity, are double-edged. They offer the opportunity for the development of trust based on voluntary commitments and an intensified intimacy. Where achieved and relatively secure, such trust is psychologically stabilising, because of the strong connections between basic trust and the reliability of caretaking figures. Given that these connections embrace feelings of security in the object-world, as well as in the sphere of personal relations as such, their importance is very considerable. The pure relationship is a key environment for building the reflexive project of the self, since it both allows for and demands organised and continuous self-understanding -- the means of securing a durable tie to the other. Of course, many actual relationships exist and endure where little symmetry is found, and where each person is held in thrall by traits in the other which on the surface repel them (co-dependency). But the tendencies towards symmetry in the pure relationship are more than just an ideal: they are in large degree inherent in its nature.

The pure relationship contains internal tensions and even contradictions. By definition, it is a social relation which can be terminated at will, and is only sustained in so far as it generates sufficient psychic returns for each individual.
On the other hand it demands commitment, not only to the other individual, but to the social relation itself: this is again intrinsic to the pure relationship.

As Giddens says that to live in the universe of high modernity is to live in an environment of chance and risk. So future is still open, but with different environments and with different platforms its shape is being constructed.

Koray Tahiroglu